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ABSTRACT. We study a situation where a decision maker relies on the report of a self-
interested and informed expert prior to decide whether to undertake a certain project. An
important feature in this interaction is that, depending on the collected information, the two
agents have potentially conicting preferences. Information contained in the report is partially
veriable in the sense that the expert can suppress favorable information sustaining the project
but he cannot exaggerate it. Our results show that this setting favors the agent which is the less
eager to undertake the project in that he always succeeds to induce his most preferred action.
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1 Introduction
We examine a situation in which a decision maker consults a self-interested and better informed
expert prior to decide whether to undertake a certain project. Such a situation is often observed
in many economic problems. For instance, for risk management, decision maker relies on scien-
tic expert to evaluate whether an activity is harmful or not as nuclear programs, transgenic
crops or new technologies. We consider a communication game where after having received infor-
mation transmitted by the expert, the decision maker chooses an action that is payo¤ relevant for
both agents (Sender-Receiver game). We consider costless and non-binding information. This
paper relies on two fundamentals assumptions. The rst one concerns the agentspreferences.
We assume that depending on the collected information, the decision maker and the expert have
potentially conicting preferences. That is, for a given information either both agents share the
same preferred action (both agents want either the project to be undertaken or not) or they
do not (one agent wants it while the other does not). Each agent would like the project to be
undertaken if and only if the information is at least as favorable as his own threshold level. Thus,
given information may be su¢ ciently favorable to carry out the project for one agent while it
is not for the other. The problem is about the information transmission since the expert is self-
interested and privately informed. Namely, if the expert is less or more eager than the decision
maker to undertake the project, the expert might have the incentive to distort his information
in order to inuence the nal decision. Our second fundamental assumption concerns the nature
of the reported information. As in Wolinsky (2002, 2003) we assume that information collected
by the expert is about the desirability of the project and is based on veriable evidence whereas
the absence of it is not veriable1. So, the expert can suppress favorable information about the
project whereas he cannot exaggerate it. Thus, in terms of veriability, the expert can prove
that his information is at least as favorable as a given level, but he cannot prove that it is not
more.
We develop a simple model with a binary set of actions and we characterize all the equilibria
of this interaction. Our results are the followings. Except for the uninformative (or pooling)
equilibrium  i.e., in which no relevant information is transmitted (Proposition 1), we show
that the nature of equilibrium is closely linked to the most eager agent. Indeed, when the expert
is less eager to undertake the project, due to the potentially conicting preferences, (generically)
all non-pooling equilibria that are monotone i.e., with outcomes satisfying that the more the
observed information sustains the project the higher is the probability to undertake it are such
that the expert always succeeds to induce his most preferred action (Proposition 2). Whereas,
when the decision maker is less eager to undertake the project, due to the veriability constraint
there always exists equilibrium where the information is fully revealed (Proposition 3). We
also show that the existence of non-monotonic equilibrium requires the existence of non-pooling
monotonic equilibrium. Furthermore, except for the pooling equilibrium, the decision maker is
(generically) better-o¤ ex-ante in any monotonic equilibrium than in any non-monotonic one
(Proposition 4).
A well-known result in the literature is that a complete provability setting gives the decision
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maker the opportunity to adopt a skeptical behavior that creates incentives for the expert to
fully reveal his private information. Here, due to our setting of partial provability this result only
holds when the expert is the more eager to undertake the project. In that case, since the expert
cannot exaggerate the favorable information sustaining the project, the decision maker can
extract all information at equilibrium by not undertaking the project at least the expert reports
him some su¢ ciently favorable information. On the contrary, when the expert is the less eager
agent the outcome of this interaction is comparable to the one where the decision maker would
completely delegate the decision-making to the expert. In that case, since the expert cannot
prove that he is not withholding some favorable information the communication becomes similar
to one without any provability (cheap-talk). And then as depending on the information both
agents may often share the same preferred action (in particular without uncertainty both agents
would agree), the decision maker totally trusts the expert.
Related Works. There exists a substantial literature considering strategic information trans-
mission with veriable information between a self-interested expert and an uninformed decision
maker.
This literature can be separated into four broad categories according to whether or not a
decision maker faces an informed party that has monotonic preferences  i.e., that wants the
decision maker to maximize (or minimize) the magnitude of his action and/or the ability to
prove all decision-relevant information.
Most of this work focuses on situations where a decision maker faces an informed party
that has both monotonic preferences and ability to prove all his decision-relevant information
(e.g., Grossman (1981), Grossman and Hart (1980), Koessler (2003), Matthews and Postle-
waite (1985), Milgrom (1981), Milgrom and Roberts (1986)). The central result called as the
unraveling argument (demonstrated in a general setting by Seidmann and Winter (1997)) is that
at equilibrium, by using a skepticism strategy the decision maker succeeds to fully extract the
informed partys private information.
Some models consider the case of an informed party with monotonic preferences in a setting
of partial provability. Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) show that the unraveling argument extends
to a situation where the decision maker knows that the informed party wants to maximize the
magnitude of his decision and is able to prove that the observed information is at least as
favorable than a certain threshold2. Shin (1994a, 1994b) provides a model in which the expert is
unable to prove the precision of his information. A skeptical inference then might be irrational
and the author shows that there is no fully revealing equilibrium. Wolinsky (2003) considers a
situation where the decision maker does not know whether the expert is of a type that wants
to maximize or minimize the magnitude of a certain action. In this setting, he characterizes
a unique equilibrium outcome as a combination of the equilibria that would prevails in the
certainty experts preferences world.
Some models of complete provability allow the experts preferences to depend on his private
information (non-monotonic preferences). When the expert can always prove his information,
Seidmann and Winter (1997) derive necessary conditions for the existence of a fully revealing
equilibrium and su¢ cient conditions for its existence and uniqueness. When in addition the ex-
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pert can prove any true event, Giovannoni and Seidmann (2006) provide necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for the existence of a separating equilibrium and/or a pooling equilibrium.
Finally, only recent literature deals with situation where the experts most preferred action
depends on his decision-relevant private information in a setting of partial provability. Mathis
(2007) generalizes Seidmann and Winters (1997) results to the partial provability setting (e.g.,
expert that is unable to prove all the information he has observed or that he is not withholding
other information). Wolinsky (2002) considers a model with multiple experts who share similar
preferences that always are in conict with the decision makers preferences. The author com-
pares cases where the decision maker may allow communication among them and whether have
or not commitment ability. In particular, he shows that in the case of no commitment and no
communication, due to the fact that experts understand that their reports matter only when
they are pivotal, no information is revealed in equilibrium.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 characterizes the equilibrium outcome of this interaction.
2 The Model
The communication game. A decision maker, DM, has to choose an action a 2 fx; yg. The
choice of the action a depends on a information v that DM does not have. The way we formalize
veriable information is similar to Wolinsky (2003). More precisely, we assume the following.
The information v 2 fv1; v2; :::; vNg; where v1 < v2 < ::: < vN : The prior distribution of v has
full support, Pr(v = vn) > 0 for all n. DM consults an expert, E, who observes v and reports
r 2 fv1; v2; :::; vNg before the decision is made. The report is partly veriable in the sense that
E can report r = vi only when the true value is vn  vi. The timing of the communication game
is represented by Figure 1.
Figure 1: The timing of the communication game
Expert learns
vi 2 fv1; v2; :::; vNg
Expert reports
r 2 fv1; v2; :::; vig
DM chooses action
a 2 fx; yg
Information phase Talking phase Action phase
Preferences. The agentspreferences depend on the action a and the collected information v.
The higher is v the more v is conveying favorable information about the action y. More precisely,
the agent js preferences, with j 2 fDM;Eg, is a function uj : fx; yg  fv1; v2; :::; vNg 7! R
where uj(a; v) denotes the js utility level when action a is taken and v is realized. We suppose
uj(x; :) decreasing in v and uj(y; :) increasing in v:Moreover, we assume uj(x; v1) > uj(y; v1) and
uj(x; vN ) < u
j(y; vN ): From these assumptions, we can characterize a threshold qj 2 (v1; vN ),
where for all n, uj(y; vn) > uj(x; vn), vn > qj and uj(y; vn) < uj(x; vn), vn < qj : With this
formulation, conicting preferences between the two agents occurs when E observes a v which is
between the two thresholds qDM and qE . For convenience, we assume that for any value, both
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agents have a strictly preferred action, that is qj 6= vn for any n; j = E;DM . Figure 2 gives the
full information benchmark for playerspreferences.
- v
qjv3v1 v2 qi
Figure 2: Full information benchmark
Both players
vN
prefer x
Both players
prefer y
Player i prefers y
player j prefers x
v4
Playersstrategies. A (mixed) strategy for E is a conditional distribution describing the
probability with which E will report vi when he has observed the value vn. E0s strategy is
denoted  = (in), where 
i
n = Pr(r = vijv = vn), n = 1; :::; N , i  n. A (mixed) strategy for
DM is a conditional distribution describing the probability with which DM will choose the action
y when he receives the report r. DMs strategy is denoted  = (i), where i = Pr(a = yjr = vi),
i = 1; :::; N . Let pin() describes DMs belief that v = vn conditional on a report r = vi when
E reports according to the strategy . If for some m, im > 0 then the conditional probability
Pr(v = vnjr = vi; ) is well dened and pin() = Pr(v = vnjr = vi; ); if im = 0 for all m,
then the only restriction on pin() is that it is consistent with the veriability assumption, i.e.,
pin() > 0 only if i  n. Following a report r = vi, the expected value of v given DMs beliefs is
E[vjr = vi; ] =
NX
m=i
vmp
i
m()
and the expected DMs utility of taking action a given DMs beliefs is
E[uDM (a; :)jr = vi; ] =
NX
m=i
uDM (a; vm)p
i
m()
We will equivalently say that DMs action a will be the best response to the report r = vi
under Es strategy  or his preferred action according to the expected value E[vjr = vi; ] if
E[uDM (a; :)jr = vi; ]  E[uDM (a0; :)jr = vi; ] for any action a0.
Equilibrium. An equilibrium is a pair (; ) such that
in > 0 implies
8><>:
i 2 argmax
kn
k if vn > qE
i 2 argmin
kn
k if vn < qE
;
i = 1 implies the action y is a DMs preferred action according to E[vjr = vi; ], and
i 2 (0; 1) implies both actions are preferred (according to E[vjr = vi; ] DM is indi¤erent
between x and y).
Thus, Es equilibrium strategy is such that when a vn > qE (resp. vn < qE) is observed,
E reports with positive probability only vis that maximizes (resp. minimizes) the probability
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that DM chooses the action y, subject to the constraint r  vn: DMs equilibrium strategy is
such that, following a report r = vi  vn; DMs action a is a preferred action according to the
expected value E[vjr = vi; ] given DMs belief. Note that the equilibrium denition embodies
the requirement that DMs belief is rational (i.e. pin(:) := Pr(v = vnjr = vi; :) > 0 only if i  n).
3 Results
This section characterizes the equilibrium outcome of this interaction. The rst three proposi-
tions deal with the monotonic equilibria that is, the equilibria which have the property that
higher values are always associated with higher probability to choose the action y. From now
on, we shall say that at equilibrium a value v induces the action y (resp. x) (without specifying
any probability) if after having observed any report sent with positive probability by an expert
with value v, DM chooses action y (resp. x) with probability 1 in that equilibrium. Due to
the veriability assumption, a report r proves that the true value v is greater or equal than r.
For any report r > qDM , DMs best response is then y. A simple and useful property on the
equilibria outcomes is the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Any equilibrium outcome satises the following:
i) Any value v > maxfqE ; qDMg induces the action y.
ii) If there is a report r < minfqE ; qDMg for which DMs best responds by x then any value
v 2 [r; qE) will induce the action x.
Lemma 1 ii) gives a su¢ cient condition for the existence of a value v which at equilibrium,
induces the action x. Proposition 1 gives the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the absence
of a value v which induces the action x with positive probability. Observes that this condition
does not depend on which is the more eager agent to undertake the project.
Proposition 1. There exists a uninformative equilibrium (which always induces the action
y) i¤ the DMs preferred action according to E(v) is y.
Straightforward to Lemma 1 i), a pooling equilibrium where action x is always taken is not
possible since an expert with information v > maxfqE ; qDMg wants and can convince DM to
take action y, by simply reporting r = v. However, an expert who wants DM to take action x is
not always able to report a convincing message since the absence of information is not veriable.
So, a pooling equilibrium may exist where action y is always taken as in Proposition 1. Of
course, existence of such an equilibrium relies on that DMs preferred action according to E(v)
is y.
Proposition 2 deals with the monotonic equilibria where E is less eager than DM to undertake
the project. The footnote of this proposition exhibits a mixed equilibrium outcome which
generically does not exist as it will be shown in the proof of Proposition 4.
Proposition 2. Suppose qDM  qE. There exists an equilibrium in which the expert
always succeeds to induce his most preferred action i¤ the DMs preferred action according to
E(vjv < qE) is x.3
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Proposition 2 states that in addition to the pooling equilibrium, when E is less eager than
DM, there may exist another monotonic equilibrium in which E always succeeds to induce his
most preferred action. Here the existence of such equilibrium does not rely on the veriability
assumption. In particular, the direction of the veriability does not allow DM to compel E
to reveal his information. Instead, this existence owes to both the fact that Es most preferred
action depends on his observed value v and that the agents may share the same preferred action.
Namely when E observes a value v he sends a report which maximizes the probability to induce
the action y if v > qE and a report which minimizes it if v < qE . When DM receives such a
report he then learns either if the value is greater or smaller than qE . In the rst case, both
agents share y as their preferred action while in the second case, the condition for DM to choose
x is that it is his preferred action according to E(vjv < qE) as exhibited in Proposition 2.
When there exists a report r for which DM best responds by x, the optimality of Es equilibrium
strategies implies that E will induce the action x when r  v < qE . Observe that such an
equilibrium is monotonic only if it also induces the action x when v < r, in particular when
v = v1. So, the report r = v1 must induces the action x. Thus, the expert always succeeds to
induce his most preferred action by reporting r = v1 when v < qE and r  v else. Otherwise,
when there does not exist such a report for which DM best responds by x, the monotonic
equilibrium is either the pooling one characterized in Proposition 1 or these of the footnote.
This latter exists only if qDM = E(vjv < qE), a condition which generically does not hold.
For notation convenience, we have assumed that qj 2 (v1; vN ), j = DM;E. This without loss
of generality since our equilibria still hold if qj 2 [v1; vN ]. Suppose that qE = vN ; whatever
the collected information, the most preferred action of E will always be the action x: Thus, as
suggested by the related literature, the unique equilibrium is pooling which induces either the
action y (Proposition 1) or the action x (Proposition 2) depending on which action is the DMs
preferred action according to E(v). Observe that the footnote of Proposition 2 deals with a
mixed equilibrium which generically does not exist.
Proposition 3 deals with the monotonic equilibria where E is more eager than DM.
Proposition 3. Suppose qE  qDM . There always exists a fully revealing equilibrium.
More generally, there exists a continuum of equilibria, parameterized by q 2 [qE ; qDM ], which
induce the action x when v  q and the action y else i¤ the DMs preferred action according to
E(vjv > q) is y.
In such a situation, as suggested by the existing literature (Grossman (1981), Grossman and
Hart (1980), Milgrom (1981)), DM can totally extract information from E by using a skepticism
strategy  that is here, a strategy in which DM takes the action x unless E convince him by
reporting a su¢ ciently high report r  qDM . In this manner the full information decision
Milgrom Roberts (1986)  the decision that would have been reached if the decision maker
had perfect access to the private information of the expert occurs. Since by denition, DMs
preferred action according to E(vjv  qDM ) is y, this fully revealing equilibrium outcome always
exists. In addition here some equilibrium also may exist in which DM can partially extract
information from E by using what we call a weakened skepticism strategy. That is a strategy in
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which DM is less compelling in the sense that rather than taking the action x unless E reports
a report r  qDM , DM takes the action x unless E reports a report r  q, with q < qDM . The
level of skepticism is parameterized by q. The lower is q, the less DM is skeptic. The condition
on the existence of such equilibria is that DMs preferred action according to E(vjv  q) is y. At
equilibrium, this is the veriability assumption which allows DM to uses some strategies relying
on skepticism. The possibly uses of weakened skepticism at equilibrium is also due to the fact
that for all value v > qE E has the same preferred action y. So by considering two di¤erent
values ~v1; ~v2; with ~v1 > ~v2 > qE , this is not costly for ~v1 to send the same report r than ~v2, as
long as r induces the action y.
Proposition 4 deals with the others equilibria outcomes of the game.
Proposition 4. All other equilibria outcomes are non-monotonic. The conditions for their
existence are more restrictive than those for the non-pooling monotonic ones. Furthermore,
except for the pooling equilibrium, DM is (generically) better-o¤ ex-ante in any monotonic equi-
librium than in any non-monotonic one.
According to Proposition 4, this game does not admit others monotonic equilibria outcomes
than those exhibited in the rst three propositions. That is, if there is another equilibrium
outcome then it is such that there are two values vk and vl, with vk < vl, satisfying that
the probability to choose action y is strictly higher under vk than under vl. Such equilibrium
outcome may exist even when players have aligned preferences as illustrated by the following
simple numerical example. Let N = 3 with Pr(v1) = Pr(v2) = 14 and Pr(v3) =
1
2 ; and both
players having same preferences represented by u(x; v1) = u(y; v3) = 1; u(y; v1) = u(x; v3) = 0;
u(x; v2) =
2
3 and u(y; v2) =
1
3 . Now consider that DM chooses x if r = v2 and y else; and
that E reports r = v1 if v 2 fv1; v3g and r = v2 if v = v2. Under such reporting strategy,
DMs updated beliefs are given by p11 =
1
3 , p
1
3 =
2
3 and p
2
2 = 1. These strategies constitute an
equilibrium that induces the action y when v 2 fv1; v3g, and x when v = v2. As it will be shown
(see Claim and proof of Proposition 4 in Appendix), the existence of non-monotonic equilibrium
outcome requires that there is a parameter q0  minfqE ; qDMg such that DMs preferred action
according to E(vjv 2 [q0; qE ]) is x and according to E(vjv =2 [q0; qE ]) is y. These conditions are
more restrictive than those of the equilibria depicted in Proposition 2 and 3. To see this, observes
that if DMs preferred action according to E(vjv 2 [q0; qE ]) is x then x is also his preferred action
according to E(vjv  qE) (as in Proposition 2). Similarly, if DMs preferred action according to
E(vjv =2 [q0; qE ]) is y then action y is still preferred according to E(vjv > qE). Observe that this
latter condition is the more restrictive condition on the parameter q exhibited in Proposition 3.
4 Conclusion
The contribution of this paper is the characterization of equilibrium in a information trans-
mission game with partially veriable reports and playerspreferences which depends on the
information collected by the expert. In this setting, we provide a intuitive result: Depending
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on the acceptability to undertake the project and the veriability constraint, either the decision
maker or the expert succeed to induce his preferred action. When the decision maker is more
skeptic to undertake the project, due to veriability constraint a fully revealing equilibrium al-
ways exists. Conversely, when the expert is more skeptic to undertake the project, veriability
constraint has no force and the equilibrium is similar to the issue of a perfect delegation setting.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. i) If v > maxfqE ; qDMg then E prefers the action y while he can
convince DM to take it by reporting r = v.
ii) For all value v < qE ; E prefers the action x. If there is a report r < minfqE ; qDMg for which
DMs best responds by x then for all value v  r; E can induce the action x by simply reporting
r. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Su¢ ciency. Consider the playersstrategy in which E reports
r = v1 regardless of v and DM ignores Es report and chooses the action y.
Necessity. Suppose not: there is a uninformative equilibrium whereas DMs preferred action
according to E(v) is not y. By denition, a uninformative equilibrium induces the same action
for any value v. For Lemma 1 i) this action is y. Observe that as a rational belief, E(v) (which
is the expected value of v with respect to the prior) satises the martingale property. Hence,
there must exists a value under which with positive probability E makes a report to which DMs
best responds by x. This leads to a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Su¢ ciency. Suppose that x is a DMs preferred action according
to E(vjv < qE). The following players strategies support the equilibrium described in the
proposition. According to v; E reports r = v1 if v  qE and reports r = v else. DM chooses the
action x if r = v1 and chooses the action y else.
Necessity. Suppose not: there is an equilibrium in which the expert always succeeds to
induce his most preferred action whereas the DMs preferred action according to E(vjv < qE)
is not x. Under such an equilibrium, there is no common report r which is sent with positive
probability by both an expert with a value v < qE and a value v > qE . So, on receipt of a
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report, DM learns whether v < qE or v > qE . Since qDM  qE , DM best responds to v > qE by
y. Now, since DMs preferred action according to E(vjv < qE) is not x, the martingale property
implies that there must is a value v < qE under which with positive probability E makes a report
to which DM best responds not by x, a contradiction.
In the special case of the footnote, for su¢ ciency just changes the DMs strategy with DM
chooses the action x with a xed probability when r = v1. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Su¢ ciency. Fix a q 2 [qE ; qDM ]. Suppose that DMs preferred
action according to E(vjv > q) is y. The following players strategies support the equilibria
described in the proposition. According to v; E reports r = v1 if v  q and reports r = minfvi 2
fv1; v2; :::; vNgjvi > qg else. DM chooses the action y if r > q and chooses the action x else.
Necessity. Suppose not: there exists an equilibrium, parameterized by q 2 [qE ; qDM ], which
induces the action x when v  q and the action y else whereas the DMs preferred action
according to E(vjv > q) is not y. Under such an equilibrium, there is no common report r which
is sent with positive probability by both an expert with a value v  q and a value v > q. So, after
he has received a report, DM learns whether v  q or v > q. Since q  qDM DM best responds
to v  q by x. Now, since DMs preferred action according to E(vjv > q) is not y, the martingale
property implies that there must exists a value v > q under which with positive probability E
makes a report to which DM best responds not by y: This leads to a contradiction. 
The following Lemma establishes some properties on the mixed equilibria we shall need
before to prove Proposition 4.
Lemma 2. i) If qE  qDM then there is no mixed equilibrium outcomes (i.e., any value
induces the action y with either probability 0 or 1).
ii) If there is a mixed equilibrium outcomes then there exists a unique mixed distribution over
the actions set fx; yg (i.e., if there exist two values ~v1 and ~v2 which induce the action y with
respectively probability 1 2 (0; 1) and 2 2 (0; 1) then 1 = 2).
Proof of Lemma 2. i) Suppose qE  qDM . At equilibrium, by Lemma 1 i) any value
v > qDM induces the action y. Therefore, there is no common report r inducing with positive
probability the action x which is sent (with positive probability) by both an expert with value
v > qDM and with value v < qDM .
ii) Suppose not: there exists a mixed equilibrium with two such values ~v1 and ~v2 with 1 and
2 satisfying 0 < 1 < 2 < 1. At equilibrium, for any value ~vi, i = 1; 2, inducing a mixed
distribution over the actions set, there exist another value v0i satisfying minf~vi; v0ig  qDM 
maxf~vi; v0ig, for which there is a common report ri sent (with positive probability) by both
values ~vi and v0i. In addition, by Lemma 2 i) q
E > qDM . So, by Lemma 1 i) ~v1 and ~v2 are both
smaller than qE . But this together with the optimality of Es strategy implies that any report
sent with positive probability by an expert with value ~vi induces the action y with probability
i. Now, from i < 1 again by Lemma 1 i) we obtain that v
0
1 and v
0
2 are both smaller than
qE . By assumption there is no ~vi = qE , we then have maxf~v1; ~v2; v01; v02g < qE . The fact that
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1 < 2 implies that the report r1 is not available to E with a value ~v2 or v
0
2. Therefore from
the direction of the veriability maxf~v2; v02g < minf~v1; v01g, a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 4. We proceed in ve steps. First, we prove that all monotonic
equilibria outcomes are those described in the previous propositions. Second, we establish a claim
which exhibits the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of some non-monotonic
equilibria. Third, we prove that there are no other non-monotonic equilibria outcomes than those
described in the claim. Fourth we show that the condition of the existence of the non-monotonic
equilibria are more restrictive that those for the monotonic ones which are not pooling. Fifth,
we conclude with the last statement of our proposition.
By denition, a monotonic equilibrium outcome o has to satisfy o(yjv1)  o(yjv2)  :::  o(yjvN ).
So, at a monotonic equilibrium DMs strategy  has to satisfy (yjr = v1)  (yjr0) for any
report r0 < qE . Otherwise, from the optimality of Es strategy we would have o(yjv1) > o(yjv)
for any value v 2 [r0; qE). At any value v < qE , Es optimal report r00 then satises (yjr =
v1) = (yjr00). By Lemma 1 i) any value v > maxfqE ; qDMg induces the action y. Consider
the case qDM  qE . Depending on (yjr = v1) we then nd either the equilibrium outcome
described in Proposition 1 (if (yjr = v1) = 1), or those described in Proposition 2 (the rst
one if (yjr = v1) = 0, and the second one (in the footnote) if (yjr = v1) 2 (0; 1)). In the
case qE  qDM by Lemma 2 i) there is no optimal DMs strategy which is mixed. So, from the
monotonicity of the equilibrium there exists a threshold q 2 [v1; vN ] such that any value v < q
(if it exists) induces the action x and any value v > q induces the action y. If q = v1, we nd
the equilibrium outcome described in Proposition 1. Otherwise, this threshold q must belong to
[qE ; qDM ] and we nd the equilibria outcomes described in Proposition 3. Therefore all other
equilibria outcomes than those exhibited in the three rst propositions are non-monotonic.
Claim. There exists a continuum of non-monotonic equilibria, parameterized by q0 
minfqE ; qDMg which induce the action x when v 2 [q0; qE ]; q0 > v1, and the action y else i¤ the
DMs preferred action according to E(vjv 2 [q0; qE ]) is x and his preferred action according to
E(vjv =2 [q0; qE ]) is y.4
Proof of the Claim. Su¢ ciency. Suppose that the DMs preferred action according to
E(vjv 2 [q0; qE ]) is x and his preferred action according to E(vjv =2 [q0; qE ]) is y. The following
playersstrategies support the equilibria described in the claim. An expert of type v reports
r = v1 if v =2 [q0; qE ] and reports rmin = minfvi 2 fv1; v2; :::; vNgjvi > q0g else. DM chooses the
action x if r = rmin and the action y else.
Necessity. Suppose there exists an equilibrium, parameterized by q0  minfqE ; qDMg, q0 > v1,
which induces the action x when v 2 [q0; qE ] and the action y else whereas DMs preferred
action according to E(vjv 2 [q0; qE ]) is not x and/or DMs preferred action according to E(vjv =2
[q0; qE ]) is not y. Under this equilibrium, all reports sent (with positive probabilities) by an expert
with value v 2 [q0; qE ] must be di¤erent than those sent by an expert with value v =2 [q0; qE ].
So, after has received a report, DM learns whether v 2 [q0; qE ] or not. Now, since either
DMs preferred action according to E(vjv 2 [q0; qE ]) is not x and/or DMs preferred action
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according to E(vjv =2 [q0; qE ]) is not y, the martingale property implies that there must exists
a value v under which with positive probability the expert makes a report to which DMs best
responds not x if v 2 [q0; qE ] and/or not y else, a contradiction. 
Now, let us prove that all non-monotonic equilibria outcomes are those described in the
claim. By Lemma 1 i) any value v > maxfqE ; qDMg induces the action y. Consider the case
qE  qDM . By Lemma 2 i) there is no mixed equilibrium. That is, any v induces either the
action x or y. From the non-monotonicity of the equilibrium, there exist two values ~v1 and ~v2
which respectively induce the action y and x and satisfying ~v1 < ~v2. From the optimality of
Es strategy, we then have ~v2 < qE and any v 2 [~v2; qE ] induces the action x. Therefore, as
established in the claim, there exists a threshold q0 = minfvjv induces the action xg such that
any v 2 [q0; qE ] induces the action x while any other v induces the action y. Now, consider the
case qE > qDM . From the non-monotonicity of the equilibrium, there exist two values ~v1 and
~v2, ~v1 < ~v2 < qE , which induce the action y with respectively probability 1 and 2, 1 > 2.
By Lemma 2 ii) if 1 < 1 then 2 = 0, and if 2 > 0 then 1 = 1. Consider the case where
2 > 0 and 1 = 1. Any v 2 [~v2; qE ] must induces the action y with probability 2. Otherwise,
if there exists a value v0 2 [~v2; qE ] which induces the action x then we either have that any
value who induces the action x is higher than qDM or that any value who induces the action y
with probability 2 is lower than q
DM . But this together with the optimality of DMs strategy
leads to a contradiction. Therefore, as established in (the footnote of) the claim, there exists
a threshold q0 = minfvjv induces the action y with probability 2g such that any v 2 [q0; qE ]
induces the action y with probability 2 while any other v induces the action y. Considering the
case where 1 < 1 and 2 = 0 leads to a contradiction. Indeed, as previously, we could establish
the existence of a threshold q0 = minfvjv induces the action xg such that any v 2 [q0; qE ] induces
the action x. Since any v > qE induces the action y, the optimality of DMs strategy involves
that 1 = 1.
Step four, let us show that the conditions exhibited in the claim for the existence of the non-
monotonic equilibria are more restrictive than those exhibited in Proposition 3 and Proposition
2. Assume qDM  qE. Fix a q0  qDM . It is easily seen that if DMs preferred action according
to E(vjv 2 [q0; qE ]) is x then x is also his preferred action according to E(vjv  qE) (as in
Proposition 2). Now, assume qE  qDM . Fix a q0  qE . If DMs preferred action according to
E(vjv =2 [q0; qE ]) is y then y is also his preferred action according to E(vjv > qE). Observe that
this latter condition, namely DMs preferred action according to E(vjv > qE) is y, is the more
restrictive condition on the parameter q exhibited in Proposition 3.
Finally, remark that the footnote of Proposition 2 deals with a mixed equilibrium outcome which
generically does not exist since it existence requires that qDM = E(vjv < qE). So by comparing
the equilibrium exhibited in Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 with those exhibited in the claim,
we trivially have that DM is generically better-o¤ ex-post (resp. ex-ante) in any monotonic
equilibrium which is not pooling than in any pure (resp. mixed) non-monotonic one. 
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NOTES
1 In this paper, the terms veriable, certiableand provableare equivalent.
2Although the authors study a situation with several experts, the full revelation of information does not rely
on the expertscompetition (contrary to Lipman and Seppi (1995)).
3The special case where according to E(vjv < qE) DM is indi¤erent between both actions x and y is a necessary
and su¢ cient condition to the existence of some (mixed) equilibria which induce the action y when v > qE and
induce the action y with a xed probability else.
4The special case where the DMs best response to E(vjv 2 [q0; qE ]) is both actions x and y is a necessary and
su¢ cient condition to the existence of some (mixed) equilibria where when v 2 [q0; qE ] the action y is induced
with a (xed) probability instead.
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